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Abstract
A Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA) is designed to distinguish
humans from machines. Most of the existing tests require reading distorted text embedded in a background image.
However, many existing CAPTCHAs are either too difficult for humans due to excessive distortions or are trivial for
automated algorithms to solve. These CAPTCHAs also suffer from inherent language as well as alphabet dependencies and
are not equally convenient for people of different demographics. Therefore, there is a need to devise other Turing tests
which can mitigate these challenges. One such test is matching two faces to establish if they belong to the same individual
or not. Utilizing face recognition as the Turing test, we propose FR-CAPTCHA based on finding matching pairs of human
faces in an image. We observe that, compared to existing implementations, FR-CAPTCHA achieves a human accuracy of 94%
and is robust against automated attacks.
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Introduction
A CAPTCHA is a Turing test designed to distinguish between
humans and automated scripts [1]. These tests ensure that the user
is a genuine person and not an automated script. CAPTCHAs can
serve a variety of applications including but not limited to
preventing: spam comments on blogs, automated fake registrations
on website registration forms, automated voting in online polls,
dictionary attacks on password systems, automated posting on
forums and message boards, and automated usage of an online
service beyond a specific threshold. Further, as detailed in Starvou
et al. [2], under certain conditions CAPTCHAs can also be used
to mitigate Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in combination with
other security mechanisms. Since a large number of organizations
and people rely on online services, DoS attacks and misuse of these
services can have high negative impact and cause loss to the
service provider. Therefore, measures against such attacks are
important to ensure secure and reliable services. As a result,
CAPTCHAs are widely used to protect online services such as
email, web transactions, and mobile banking.
Current CAPTCHAs include several tests such as recognizing
handwritten characters, differentiating between images of cats and
dogs, and recognizing numbers or characters in a given audio/
video segment. However, these CAPTCHAs suffer from various
drawbacks. Text-based CAPTCHAs such as reCAPTCHA [3]
require a user to decipher distorted text. Sometimes excessive
distortion is used in these CAPTCHAs to secure against automatic
attacks. Large amounts of distortions make these CAPTCHAs
difficult and time-consuming for a genuine user to solve. Although
there is provision to request a new instance of the CAPTCHA, this
interrupts the user experience.
In addition, text-based CAPTCHAs inherently suffer from
alphabet and language dependencies. Most of these are designed
using the English alphabet which may be easily solved by a native
English speaker. However, users belonging to different demo-
graphics (non-English native language) can face difficulty in
solving these CAPTCHAs. Von Ahn et al. [3] and Bursztein et al.
[4] showed concrete evidence of such dependencies of the
CAPTCHA. Since web services are not limited to regions with
English-speaking populations, addressing these limitations is
important for designing a widely usable CAPTCHA. Image-based
CAPTCHAs such as IMAGINATION [5] and Asirra [6] do not
demonstrate any such dependence. However, both of these have
been solved successfully by automatic algorithms and hence are
vulnerable to attacks [7], [8]. IMAGINATION does include an
annotation step to provide an additional security layer against
bots. However, this step involves identifying the category of a
displayed image from several presented options and the user is
required to possess a decent English vocabulary in order to solve it.
Therefore, IMAGINATION also suffers from language and
alphabet dependencies similar to reCAPTCHA.
Video [9] and audio-based [10] CAPTCHAs have also been
explored in literature. However, video CAPTCHAs require higher
bandwidth compared to text and image CAPTCHAs. Tradition-
ally, the size of a text/image-based CAPTCHA is less than a few
kilobytes whereas video CAPTCHAs might easily be several
megabytes in size. Therefore, they are not ideal for situations
where bandwidth is scarce, such as in developing countries and
also in cases when the user is utilizing 2G networks or usage-
limited costly 3G networks. In such scenarios, incurring additional
data usage charges for a security measure is not acceptable to
users. While audio CAPTCHAs provide a means to account for
visually impaired users, they require sound output to be enabled
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on the device which may not always be possible. Audio
CAPTCHAs add background noise to the encoded message
which makes it difficult to decipher without good sound quality
and sufficient clarity. Also, some users may face difficulty in
understanding the message regardless of noise because of
unfamiliarity with the accent in which the audio message is
communicated.
This research explores the possibility of using face recognition to
address the challenges with existing CAPTCHAs. Face recognition
is a highly intuitive task for humans that can be used as a Turing
test. Unlike the aforementioned tests, it does not suffer from
language dependency. The human mind performs these functions
every day and is very effective in recognizing human faces.
However, even after decades of research in face detection and
recognition, there exist several challenges in designing effective
and accurate algorithms for automatic face detection and
recognition. The distortions such as rotation, noise, blur, blending
with the background, and occluding facial features can cause face
detection algorithms to falsely reject a face. Automatic face
detection algorithms are also unable to accurately distinguish
between synthetically generated faces and human faces. The
results of the Multiple Biometric Evaluation (MBE) [11] show that
state-of-the-art face recognition algorithms yield good perfor-
mance for controlled face recognition. However, their perfor-
mance is greatly reduced when the images are captured in an
uncontrolled environment with variations such as pose and
inconsistent image quality [12]. In contrast, research in cognitive
science has shown that humans are good at recognizing familiar
faces even if they are of poor quality and distorted [13]. Recent
research has shown that under partially controlled conditions and
with sufficient image size, even in the case of unfamiliar faces,
humans perform better than automatic algorithms [14]. Our
previous work explores the possibility of using only face detection
to design a CAPTCHA [15]. In this research, our hypothesis is: ‘‘A
CAPTCHA that requires face detection and recognition should be
challenging for automatic algorithms while being simple for
humans to solve.’’ Since the research in design of CAPTCHAs has
focused on developing tests that are easy for humans but difficult
for machines, incorporating challenging face detection and
recognition tests in CAPTCHA can enhance their security.
Figure 1. Natural variations present in face images. Variations such as expression and illumination are common even when pose of the face
image is fixed to be frontal. The performance of automated face recognition attack algorithms suffers in the presence of such natural variations
whereas these are easy to process for humans.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0091708.g001
Figure 2. The FR-CAPTCHA generation process. An image of the same size is created using a randomly selected set of human faces and other
non-face images after applying different amounts of rotation to each image. A background of the same size is generated using various colored
shapes. A new image is generated by blending this image with the background. This combined image is then further processed to add noise,
illumination variance, and false edges. The resulting image is a FR-CAPTCHA.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0091708.g002
FR-CAPTCHA
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Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The human study is conducted with the help of volunteers with
18+ years of age. Prior to collecting human responses, the written
consent of the volunteers is obtained and they are informed that
their responses would be used for research and analysis purposes.
Names or any other identifiable information of the volunteers are
not collected. All the procedures used in the current study are
approved by the IIIT-Delhi Ethics Board.
Stimuli
The face images used in the CAPTCHAs are taken from the
AR face database [16] which allows use for research and
publication with proper citation. The non-face images are
available under the Creative Commons license and are taken
from various sources on the internet.
Methodology
Face recognition is a problem that every healthy human mind
solves everyday, usually even without conscious effort. Cognitive
research has found that human face recognition can function even
in the presence of a multitude of covariates such as pose,
expression, illumination, occlusion, aging, alterations and their
combinations [13]. On the other hand, automated face recogni-
tion algorithms perform poorly when such challenges are present.
The proposed CAPTCHA leverages this parity by utilizing
distortions and natural variations of human faces to increase
difficulty for automated attacks. Natural face variations such as
shown in Figure 1 are easy for the human mind to process but
difficult for automated algorithms. In addition to natural
variations, the task can be made even more challenging by
applying artificial distortions to the face images and embedding
these on a complex background. However, adding artificial
distortions may adversely impact both machine and human
performance. As discussed previously, an ideal CAPTCHA should
be easy for humans to solve while being robust towards automated
algorithms. Therefore, the artificial distortions are applied within
certain limits based on the sets of parameters. These distortion
parameter sets have to be optimized in order to achieve the best
tradeoff between ease for human users solving the CAPTCHA and
difficulty for automated algorithms.
The proposed CAPTCHA is a single composite image
containing multiple human face and non-face images on a
background with varying degrees of distortion. In order to solve
it, the user is required to match human faces (faces belonging to a
single individual) on the CAPTCHA. The proposed FR-
CAPTCHAs are designed using an adversarial learning-based
algorithm. Since the objective of the CAPTCHA generation
process is to maximize human accuracy while minimizing machine
accuracy, automatic face recognition algorithms act as the
adversary in the proposed approach. The CAPTCHA generation
process depends on several parameters that need to be optimized.
The FR-CAPTCHA generation process can be formulated as,
C~F (f ,w) ð1Þ
Here, F is a function that utilizes face and non-face images, f ,
along with the sets of parameters w, to generate the FR-
CAPTCHA denoted by C. The sets of parameters control the
difficulty of the generated CAPTCHA. Using an adversarial
learning approach and gradient descent optimization, the
optimum sets of parameters are obtained such that the human
accuracy is maximized and machine accuracy is minimized. In
order to achieve this objective, the CAPTCHA generation process
is divided into two different processes: learning the optimum sets of
parameters, and utilizing the learned sets of parameters to
generate new FR-CAPTCHAs. The useful sets of parameters wu
are learned according to Equation (2):
Figure 3. Distortions involved in the FR-CAPTCHA generation process.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0091708.g003
FR-CAPTCHA
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wu~Train(C~F (f ,wi )(ah~1,am~0) ð2Þ
where, ah denotes the human response and am denotes the
machine response. A correct response is depicted with the value 1,
whereas an incorrect response is depicted with the value 0. Out of
all the possible parameter sets wi, only the useful parameter sets
wu
are chosen according to the specified constraint on ah and am. It is
to be noted that the constraint denotes the ideal criteria that a
CAPTCHA has to fulfill: maximum human performance and
minimum machine performance. Therefore, parameter sets
conforming to other constraints are not useful for FR-CAPTCHA
generation. Further, in Equation (2), the process Train represents
gradient descent learning. For a given set of parameters wt, let
Eh,m(wt) be the objective function that minimizes the error caused
by four constraints associated with ah and am i.e.,
Eh,m(wt)~
0 if ah~1 and am~0
1 otherwise

ð3Þ
In gradient descent, optimal parameters are obtained using
Equations (4) and (5).
+Eh,m(wt)~
dEh,m(wt)
dw
ð4Þ
wtz1~
wt{g+Eh,m(wt) ð5Þ
Here, Eh,m(wt) denotes the gradient of the objective function at the
tth learning iteration and g is the learning rate used to control the
rate at which parameter learning converges. The initial parameter
assignment determines the final outcome of gradient descent
learning. Therefore, the initial assignment is performed using
small scale experiments with both humans and automatic
algorithms. An intermediate experiment is performed in order to
obtain human responses. The details of the experiment are
presented in the results section. Since the CAPTCHA perfor-
mance depends on both human and machine responses, machine
adversaries are also required to be analyzed. As FR-CAPTCHA is
based on face detection and recognition, automatic face detection
and recognition algorithms are suitable adversaries. Therefore,
machine adversaries based on the Viola-Jones face detector [17]
and a commercial face recognition system (COTS) are used. The
methodology involved with the adversaries is detailed below:
1. Given a CAPTCHA image C, a set of images c1 to cn are
created by rotating the CAPTCHA image by n incremental
rotation levels ranging from 0u to 360u degrees in order to
handle the random rotation in the constituent images.
2. For each CAPTCHA image c1 to cn, the Viola-Jones face
detector [17] is utilized and face detection is performed with
three different window sizes (window size is a parameter of
Viola-Jones face detector).
3. The detected face coordinates are matched with the actual
embedded face locations. The number of correctly located face
images is stored and the number of all unique faces detected
from the CAPTCHA is obtained by summation over the set of
images c1 to cn. For example, if a face image was only correctly
identified in c1 but not in any other images, it is still counted as
a successful detection.
4. If the cumulative successful face image detections equal the
actual number of human faces in the CAPTCHA, it is
considered as a correct response by the face detection
adversary, otherwise it is not.
5. The methodology of the machine adversary based on face
recognition COTS is the same as the one based on Viola-Jones
detector. The difference between the two is that in Step 2, face
detection is performed using the COTS face detection module
instead of Viola-Jones. If COTS is able to detect two face
images, then recognition module is invoked to match them.
Face recognition adversary is successful if it is able to detect at-
least two faces and find a correct face pair.
Figure 4. Example of correct and incorrect responses to the proposed FR-CAPTCHA. It can be solved correctly if and only if a matching
pair of human faces is selected by the user. Each blue circle represents a user response. As shown, selecting two face images of the same person is
considered as a correct response, while selecting a non-face image or two images of different persons is considered an incorrect response.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0091708.g004
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As per Equation (5), the learning process considers both the
human response (h) as well as the response of the automatic
algorithm (m). The gradient descent learning converges to multiple
optimal sets of parameters that maximize the likelihood of being
solved successfully by humans and minimize the likelihood of
being solved successfully by automatic algorithms. The optimal
sets of parameters are then utilized in the testing phase of FR-
CAPTCHA.
Figure 2 shows the steps involved in generating the proposed
FR-CAPTCHA based on the optimum sets of parameters. The
optimum parameter sets describe the range of parameter values
for the various operations that are essential to the generation
process. For example, a parameter set can specify that rotation
angle has to lie within the interval ½300,900. This means that even
though the final rotation applied to each image in the FR-
CAPTCHA is chosen in a stochastic manner, it is bound to lie
between the specified upper and lower limits. First, a set of human
face and non-face images is selected from a database of images.
The number of human face and non-face images can vary in
individual instances of FR-CAPTCHA and is randomly decided at
the time of generation. The only constraint in selecting face images
for the CAPTCHA is that there must be at least two matching face
pairs. A matching pair of faces is one in which both faces belong to
the same individual, but are not the exact same image. Each
selected image is resized according to the parameter set and then
positioned on a blank image of size 600|400. Since modern
devices with varying screen sizes are used to access the internet,
the choice of size is an important factor. This size preserves the
details required by a human to successfully perform face
recognition without being too large for devices with small screens,
e.g., mobile and tablet devices. The images are placed at randomly
selected positions such that they do not overlap beyond a specified
threshold and the overlapping region is created using a weighted
average of the overlapping images. We select multiple distortions
for this purpose such as rotation, noise, illumination, false edges,
adding non-face images, and image blending with the complex
background. Further, to maintain unpredictability, each of these
artificial distortions is applied in a stochastic manner but with an
intensity that is regularized by the optimum parameter sets. The
parameters control the difficulty of the generated CAPTCHA.
After placing all the component images, a background image of
the same size (600|400) is generated. To generate the
background image a large number of shapes, varying in size,
color and type (circle, rectangle, cross, ellipse), are placed on an
image. Patches of skin color are also placed on the background to
obfuscate skin color-based segmentation algorithms. Using a
weighted average blending scheme, the background is combined
with the image containing rotated and resized faces obtained in
the first step.
To further enhance the security of the CAPTCHA, irregular
variations in illumination are introduced to the image. In addition,
a random amount of free-form lines are drawn on the image to
introduce false edges and emoticon images are blended in with the
CAPTCHA at dynamically selected locations. For any machine
adversary, the first step towards solving the CAPTCHA is
segmentation into distinct sections so that the embedded faces
can be extracted for matching. Adding false edges and emoticons
introduces false positives for edge and face detection algorithms
respectively, and therefore, increases the security of the generated
CAPTCHA. The distortions utilized in generating FR-
CAPTCHA are illustrated in Figure 3. The complete step-by-
step process of generating a FR-CAPTCHA is summarized below:
1. Image selection and image level distortions
(a) The number of human faces to place on the CAPTCHA is
decided. This number can vary from 4 to 6.
(b) The number of non-human images in the CAPTCHA is set
such that the total number of faces in the CAPTCHA is 12.
(c) The required number of face and non-face images are
randomly selected from the corresponding databases.
(d) Each selected image is resized to a size that can range from
100|125 to 175|150.
(e) Each selected image is rotated by an angle that is
stochastically chosen such that it lies within a range specified
by the parameter set.
(f) For each image, a random coordinate (x, y) is generated.
Then a check is performed to verify if the image can fit
Figure 5. Examples of FR-CAPTCHA. The CAPTCHAs are numbered
according to the set numbers assigned in Tables 1 and 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0091708.g005
FR-CAPTCHA
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inside the CAPTCHA boundaries if (x, y) is used as the top-
left corner of the image.
(g) Check if the image overlaps with an existing image on the
CAPTCHA. If so, both images are blended together using
weighted average blending. The weights depend on whether
or not the overlapping image is a face. The face image is
assigned higher weight in the blending process compared to
the non-face image in order to facilitate human recognition.
These weights are a part of the parameter set of FR-
CAPTCHA generation which is subject to optimization.
(h) Repeat steps (d), (e), (f) and (g) until all 12 selected images
have been placed.
2. Background generation
(a) An image of size 600|400 is generated.
(b) A number of shapes such as squares, crosses, and ellipses are
generated with varying sizes and colors. These variations, as
well as the amount of shapes to be generated, are controlled
by respective parameters which specify the range of values
that these parameters may take.
(c) These generated shapes are placed randomly on the
background image without consideration for overlap.
(d) Finally, the background image is eroded and dilated with
varying structuring elements to generate the final back-
ground for the FR-CAPTCHA.
3. Combining background with CAPTCHA image
(a) The background image is blended with the CAPTCHA
image using weighted averaging blending. The weights
assigned to the background and foreground (CAPTCHA
image) are part of the parameter set.
(b) The weight assigned to the foreground is higher in the
regions where there already exists an overlap of face images
prior to combination with the background. This is to ensure
that every region in the FR-CAPTCHA is discernible by
humans.
4. The resultant CAPTCHA image (foreground with selected
human and non-human images and background) is subjected
to further distortions based on the parameter set. These
distortions include:
(a) Adding fake edges: Irregularly oriented jagged lines with
flexible starting and ending locations.
(b) Adding illumination variations: The CAPTCHA image is
divided into a variable number of non-uniform grids. These
grids are then subjected to gamma adjustment with different
gamma values such that some grids are made lighter and
some are made darker.
(c) Adding emoticon images: A database of emoticon images is
used to select and place few emoticon images on random
locations in the CAPTCHA image. These emoticon images
serve as false positives for face detection algorithms and
make segmentation of the individual faces difficult.
(d) Adding noise: A certain percentage of the total number of
pixels in the FR-CAPTCHA are corrupted by modifying
their values. The percentage of pixels to corrupt is decided
on the basis of the parameter set and their locations to
corrupt are chosen at random.
Figure 4 presents an example of FR-CAPTCHA along with
sample correct and incorrect responses. As mentioned previously,
every FR-CAPTCHA contains at least two pairs of faces belonging
to the same individual. In order to solve the test and verify that the
user is human, he/she must mark the locations of two human faces
in the image which belong to any one of the matching pairs. If any
of the marked locations is not a human face or the faces marked
belong to different individuals, the response is considered
incorrect; otherwise, it is considered correct and the CAPTCHA
is considered solved. The process of solving the FR-CAPTCHA
involves both detecting the locations of human faces in the image
Figure 6. Human performance and preference on reCAPTCHA, IMAGINATION and the proposed FR- CAPTCHA. Based on 2,997
responses, the proposed CAPTCHA achieves higher human performance and is also preferred by majority (80%) of the users. The error bars represent
confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0091708.g006
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as well as recognizing which faces match with others in the image.
The FR-CAPTCHA thus requires a user to solve both face
detection and recognition problems. The process of solving a FR-
CAPTCHA is also detailed below:
1. Each FR-CAPTCHA has a total of 12 images. Only 6 (at most)
of these images can be human faces. Every user is allowed 2
clicks in total to solve a FR-CAPTCHA. For an attempt to be
called successful, the following conditions must hold true for
the 2 clicks made by the user:
(a) Both the clicks have to be located within the area of human
face images. If any of the clicks lie in a region which is part of
the background or a non-human face image, then the
attempt is invalid. This is the face detection test. Among the
incorrect responses shown in Figure 4, the first response
violates this condition.
(b) Both the human face images selected by the user (by clicking
in their region) have to belong to the same individual. If both
images are human faces but belong to different individuals,
then the attempt is invalid. Each FR-CAPTCHA has at least
two correct ways to be solved, i.e., there are 2 pairs of face
images that belong to the same individual. The user has to
pick any of these pairs. This is the face recognition test.
Among the incorrect responses shown in Figure 4, the
second response violates this condition.
Results and Discussion
FR-CAPTCHA is evaluated in two phases. The first phase of
testing is performed during parameter optimization in order to
obtain human and machine adversary responses for gradient
descent learning. The second phase of testing is performed on the
optimized FR-CAPTCHA in order to assess its robustness towards
automated attack as well as ensure ease of use for humans. The
following sections provide the details of these results.
Parameter Optimization
As discussed in the previous section, human responses are
required in order to optimize the set of parameters for FR-
CAPTCHA generation. An initial set of FR-CAPTCHAs is
generated with multiple sets of parameters and human perfor-
mance is evaluated on these sets. The parameter values are
explained in Table 1 and 10 parameter sets on which the
optimization/evaluations are performed are listed in the Table 2.
A total of 300 CAPTCHAs are generated - 30 CAPTCHAs for
each parameter set. Human performance on each set are
presented in Table 2. During the human performance test, each
CAPTCHA is presented to multiple volunteers. Each CAPTCHA
is successfully solved by at least one attempting volunteer. Human
performance data on these sets provides valuable insight into the
impact of each distortion towards human accuracy. For example,
the observation that human performance is lower in set 10
compared to set 9 implies that adding emoticon images and high
global distortions negatively impact human performance. There-
fore, it becomes clear that increasing the level of these distortions
corresponds to a proportionate increase in the difficulty of the
entire CAPTCHA. This deduction can be supported by the results
of other sets and relationships between the distortions and
CAPTCHA difficulty can be established. Tuning these distortions
optimally then becomes relatively easier. In order to achieve
maximum human accuracy, the distortions must be chosen such
that the CAPTCHA is easy to solve, however, it must still be
resilient against machine attack and therefore a balance has to be
achieved via the optimization process. During this phase, the key
observations are as follows:
1. Overall, across all the sets, 96% training accuracy is achieved
using 1794 responses from 220 volunteers.
2. Even though human performance is high across all the sets,
reduced accuracies are observed when the blending level is
high (79.2% in set 7). The blend effect causes the visibility of
the face image to deteriorate significantly, especially due to the
overlapping images and highly randomized background.
Therefore, it is noted that the maximum level of blend requires
to be reduced in the optimized set of parameters.
3. It is also observed that rotation, global distortions and
emoticons have relatively smaller negative impact and these
distortions can be utilized without compromising the human
performance.
4. For easier sets, automatic face detection algorithms (adversar-
ies) are able to detect some faces in the CAPTCHA images.
However, with increase in distortions, automatic algorithms are
unable to find genuine faces.
Human Performance Evaluation of FR-CAPTCHA
For evaluation, a set of 500 CAPTCHAs are used with varying
difficulty and collected responses in two sessions in different
demographic settings (i.e., India and the United States). Some key
observations are as follows:
1. In session 1, we collected 30,000 responses from 3,000 users
with an overall accuracy of 98.36% (29,507 correct responses).
In session 2, we collected 12,000 responses from over 1,200
users with an overall accuracy of 84.89% (10,187 correct
responses). In both sessions, each CAPTCHA image is shown
to multiple volunteers. The CAPTCHAs are presented to the
users on a webpage where they are provided general
instructions on how to solve a FR-CAPTCHA.
2. Using a weighted average based on the fraction of responses
contributed by each session (30,000 responses in session 1 and
12,000 responses in session 2), we get an overall human
accuracy of 94% over the two sessions.
3. We also observe that performance depends on the difficulty
level of the CAPTCHA. The CAPTCHAs used for evaluation
corresponded to ten different difficulty levels. Table 3 provides
detailed per-set analysis of human performance on these
CAPTCHAs. Set 1 is the easiest set with no distortions,
whereas, Set 10 is the hardest set with the maximum amount of
distortion. As we can see in Table 3, for a particular session,
human accuracy does not decrease by a large amount even
with considerable increase in distortion across various sets. The
difference between the best and worst performance is only
6.6% in session 1 and 7.1% in session 2. This supports our
initial hypothesis that humans can recognize faces even in
unfavorable conditions with unfamiliar faces. Though the
difference in the overall performance in both sessions is much
higher, a part of this can be attributed to the difference in the
conditions during response collection. Another inference that
can be drawn from the set analysis is that out of all the
distortions, blending with background has maximum effect on
human performance. This is evident from the performance
values in Sets 3, 7, and 9 which are clearly much lower than the
sets of comparable difficulty, with similar amount of distortions.
Figure 5 presents an example FR-CAPTCHA image belonging
to each of these sets.
FR-CAPTCHA
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4. Another interesting observation is that the face images utilized
in the experiment belong to the AR Face database which
mainly comprises Caucasian subjects. The Other Race Effect
(ORE), which has been explored in face recognition literature,
suggests that volunteers from the Caucasian race should
perform significantly better than non-Caucasian volunteers.
Our results show that, for solving FR-CAPTCHA, Indian
volunteers have overall better performance and ORE is not
observed. Since the FR-CAPTCHA test only involves
differentiating between two pairs of face images, the impact
of ORE is minimal in this scenario. Further, in order to
minimize the possibility of human failure, the selection of the
face dataset utilized to generate FR-CAPTCHA for a
particular web resource can be easily adjusted according to
the ethnicity of the primary target audience.
Comparison with reCAPTCHA and IMAGINATION
In addition to FR-CAPTCHA, human performance is evalu-
ated on two other CAPTCHAs, the popular reCAPTCHA and
IMAGINATION. A majority of the volunteers were not native
English speakers. For each of the three CAPTCHAs, 2,997
responses were collected. Out of these, 1,008 responses were
correct for reCAPTCHA, 1,646 responses were correct for Stage 1
of IMAGINATION, and 2,937 responses were correct for the
proposed FR-CAPTCHA. Each user attempted one each of these
three CAPTCHAs and was asked his/her preference based on the
ease with which they could solve these tests. 80% of the users
preferred the proposed FR-CAPTCHA over reCAPTCHA and
IMAGINATION which were preferred by 8% and 12% of the
users respectively. The results of this evaluation are presented in
Figure 6.
Performance of FR-CAPTCHA against Automated Attack
Besides efficient human performance, a CAPTCHA must also
be resilient towards automatic attacks. Since the first step towards
breaking a CAPTCHA would be to detect and segment the faces
from the entire image, face detection tests were executed on the
FR-CAPTCHAs using the above mentioned machine adversaries,
but all of the face images were not detected correctly in any of the
test CAPTCHAs. In addition, a script designed to find bounding
boxes of objects embedded in CAPTCHAs which is successfully
able to decipher the objects in IMAGINATION CAPTCHA, was
not able to locate all of the objects in any face recognition
CAPTCHA [7]. Also, the probability of correctly solving a face
recognition CAPTCHA by a random guess method is approxi-
mately 0.0069 or 7 in 1000. A detailed computation is presented
below:
Table 1. Range of Parameter values.
Parameter Value
No rotation 0u
Low rotation 0u–60u
Medium rotation 30u–120u
High rotation 45u–170u
No blend 100% foreground
Low blend 80% foreground
Medium blend 65% foreground
High blend 50% foreground
No global distortions illumination = false, false edges = false
Low global distortions either illumination or false edges
High global distortions illumination = true, false edges = true
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0091708.t001
Table 2. Human performance for each set of CAPTCHAs during parameter optimization phase.
Set No. Distortion Human Accuracy (%)
1 No rotation, no blend, no global distortions, no emoticons 100
2 Low rotation, no blend, no global distortions, no emoticons 100
3 Low rotation, low blend, no global distortions, no emoticons 100
4 Low rotation, low blend, low global distortions, no emoticons 100
5 Low rotation, low blend, low global distortions, emoticons 100
6 High rotation, low blend, low global distortions, no emoticons 100
7 Low rotation, high blend, no global distortions, no emoticons 79.2
8 Medium rotation, medium blend, no global distortions, emoticons 90.0
9 Low rotation, low blend, low global distortions, no emoticons 100
10 Low rotation, low blend, high global distortions, emoticons 92.0
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0091708.t002
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The number of pixels in a FR-CAPTCHA of size 600|400 is
240,000. If we assume a constant size of each face image
(100|100), for a correct response the automated algorithm has to
guess a pixel belonging to a face. Since there are two matching
pairs of genuine faces (i.e. total of 4 face images pertaining to 2
individuals), the probability of this guess being correct is:
4|100|100/240,000= 0.167. The next guess has to lie in the
face region of the matching face failing which it will be an invalid
guess and the entire attempt will fail. Therefore, since only a
100|100 region is the favorable outcome, the probability of this
guess being correct is: 100|100/239,999= 0.0417. Note that
here, the previous pixel will not be counted for a valid guess and
hence the number of possible outcomes (pixels) becomes 239,999.
Also, since it may so happen that the pixel in the first case was
chosen on the edge of the face region, the immediately adjacent
pixel might contain the matching face. Therefore, even adjacent
pixels remain possible candidates for selection in this step and the
number of possible outcomes is not reduced any lower than
239,999. Following these calculations, the possibility of the entire
attempt being correct is: 0.167|0.0417= 0.0069 or approximate-
ly 7 in 1000.
It should be noted, however, that this calculation assumes that
all face regions are of the same size, which is not the case.
Therefore, the above calculation can only be considered as an
approximation of the probability that a random guess can solve
any given FR-CAPTCHA image.
Conclusion
In this paper, a novel CAPTCHA is proposed which utilizes
face recognition and detection as the Turing test. By analyzing the
results obtained using two demographically diverse groups of
volunteers, we can assert that the proposed CAPTCHA is user-
friendly and easy to solve. Moreover, it is robust and secure against
automated attack. It addresses the language/alphabet dependency
challenges of text-based CAPTCHAs while remaining intuitive
and simple for human users. In addition, the success of the
proposed CAPTCHA also confirms that humans can match faces
under severe distortion with high accuracy. We believe that the
proposed face recognition CAPTCHA facilitates security against
bots in online services without compromising user convenience.
Additional Information: Website for FR-CAPTCHA:
http://research.iiitd.edu.in/groups/iab/frcaptcha.html.
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